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░ ABSTRACT: This paper advances the view that the deep confidence of market regulators in the assumptions and
premises of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has led to the underestimation of market risks, thus inactivating the market
education of existing and future investors. Hence, they have not responded to financial illiteracy, which exacerbated the recent
financial crisis. Investor education may be considered as a systemic risk management tool for future financial crises and,
especially, financial literacy can drive a wedge between the regulation and the prevention of severe financial crises based on
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░ 1. INTRODUCTION
Two decades ago, we began to witness the largest financial
crisis in practically a century, incurring losses for economies,
investors, funds, borrowers and lenders. The harshness of the
recent financial turmoil has forced investors, academics,
regulators and policymakers to reconsider the nexus of
financial markets, revisit the role and functions of financial
intermediaries and institutions, and reexamine the regulatory
architecture across the markets. Most studies have viewed the
crisis first as a regulatory failure and raised serious questions
about the validity of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH)
and about the rationality of investors’ decision making. EMH
was developed independently by P. Samuelson, and E. Fama,
in the mid-1960s and since then has received an abundance of
attention. Hence, this is an auspicious time to revisit the theory
of efficient markets and its implications for financial
regulation and public policy. Analyzing regulators’ belief in
EMH during recent financial crisis is relevant for a number of
reasons. First, it offers insights into assessing the role of EMH
in explaining the crisis matters for its failure in detecting
bubbles in assets prices [1, 2]. The degree of anchoring to
EMH of regulators and investors is thus likely to affect both
the depth and severity of crisis and guide financial architecture
accordingly [3, 4]. Second, the financial crisis and its
implications constitute an on-going challenge for
contemporary mainstream economics, as severe financial
events do not match with basic economic theories [5].
Although no longer new to the academy, revisiting this
Website: www.ijbmr.forexjournal.co.in

framework is particularly appropriate because we are now
experiencing a re-evaluation of the efficiency of the financial
system supported by a growing number of applied financial
studies in both developed and emerging capital markets that
have provided evidence against market efficiency. Brown [6]
in his excellent paper, analyzed the empirical findings of EMH
and its practical and intellectual implications for the last 75
years. In other words last decades, showed a paradigm shift
from rational expectation and investors’ homogeneity to an
alternative, where economic agents are heterogeneous and
boundedly rational. Finally, the recent financial crisis
demonstrated the critical importance of financial literacy and
investor education both for the economic welfare of
households and for the stability of the financial system as a
whole [7, 8].
This paper advances the view that the deep confidence of
market regulators in the EMH has led to the underestimation
of market risks, thus inactivating the education of existing and
future investors, i.e. they have not responded to financial
illiteracy, which exacerbated the crisis. There is also a paradox
here, namely that while technology increases the accessibility
of the average investor to the markets and to the majority of
financial instruments, financial illiteracy also increases [9]
although the opposite should hold. That is a positive
relationship between the increased financial innovation with
the need for the general society to be knowledgeable about
those financial products [10]. This in combination with the
complexity of financial instruments leads to increased
difficulty of pricing and interpretation is in the core of future
financial crisis. In this paper, we examine the implications of
the efficient market hypothesis and its role in financial crises
given financially illiterate investors and ad hoc regulatory
solutions.
The many references by regulators and academics [4, 11, 12]
combined with the rapid deregulation of markets, the
development of financial innovation and the increase in
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leverage, have resulted in the development of so-called "grey"
areas in financial markets that is, where the supervisory
mechanism has not been adequate and led to the last crisis
with greater ease and speed than before. Regulators failed in at
least three ways, in that they (i) were indifferent to the
excessive profits of these markets, as they believed that market
prices discount all available information and thus, are good
signals of rationally assessed real value of firms, (ii)
underestimated the subsequent risks as predicted by their
statistical models under normality assumptions, and (iii)
overestimated market discipline as an effective tool in
reducing risk. As a result, regulators were inactive and
submissive to the hegemony of the EMH, believing that the
markets would exhibit efficiency and would find their
equilibrium.
But instead of believing that markets are efficient under the
strict assumptions of rational expectations (the EMH) which
implies that investors are aware of the nature and risks of the
financial products, it would be safer to assume that markets are
more “in love” with extremes (Minsky's hypothesis), that
returns are characterized by long-term memory (characteristic
of chaotic markets), and that the occurrence of the next crisis
is highly probable. The speed of price adjustment in new
information is the key factor for long-memory asset returns
against market efficiency. However, this process is not only
concerned with the collection of information, not even the
management of new data and evidence. The fundamental
understanding of information and its basic interpretation is the
first-order concern in the ability to make informed decisions
and effective choices regarding the use and management of
investment alternatives. However, it is often the case that not
all groups in society have the necessary literacy to understand
information about different financial products, which may be
vital for their financial wellbeing [13] and contribute most to
overall happiness compared to satisfaction in family, health
and work domain [14].
Although financial literacy becomes increasingly common and
of growing importance, very few is recognizing its role as a
systemic risk management tool. For instance, many studies
[15, 16] found that people do not understand even the basic
terms in a financial contract. Barber, et al. [17] reported that
most investors have no the required education to choose a
mutual fund that fits their needs as they have no formal
training to understand the factors affecting the performance,
the risks, and the diversification benefits of such a product.
Also, Siriopoulos and Skaperda [18] offered evidence that
investors in US mutual fund industry pay higher fees for the
same return. Blue and Brimble [19] presented the importance
of embedding financial literacy education into primary and
secondary school curriculums.
In particular, regulators now understand that markets and
investors may not have the training and the experience to
address the risks posed by complex market conditions and
products and therefore systematically underestimate these
risks. Then, if so, an effective way to deal with this is for there
to be synergies and complementarity: active regulators,
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systematic education of economic agents, compliance training
and financial literacy, together representing a convex strategy.
A convex payoff function is expressed in the difference
between possible gains and losses. Thus, investor education
may be considered as a systemic risk management tool for
future financial crises; in particular, financial literacy can drive
a wedge between the regulation and the prevention of severe
financial crises based on expected benefits versus losses. This
also will help to regain investors’ trust in the market after the
crisis and deliver investors with more confidence. This
approach has not yet received the attention it deserves.
The basic methodological feature of this paper is the logical
analysis. We first question the hegemony of the EMH, and we
report on its failure. Second, we investigate its role in the
recent financial crisis and the witness of regulators. Third, we
analyze the complementarity of regulators and financial
education as a systemic risk management tool. These questions
operate on different levels, with the second and third question
aiming for illustrating general developments regarding the role
that financial literacy might have in a future financial crisis.
The first question, on the other hand, focuses on the failure of
the mainstream paradigm and its fundamental cause that is the
mechanisms of the capitalistic system and the limitations of its
ongoing financialization.
The aim of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the
impact of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and its rational
expectations corollary on the financial crisis. For this purpose,
the paper contextualizes the role and effects of EMH in the
financial crisis and contributes to the debate on financial
literacy and financial market risk. The role of EMH and its
implications aftermath the recent financial crisis from a
regulators’ point of view is discussed and analyzed within the
discourses on ideology in curriculum design.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section
reviews the literature under the hegemony of the EMH, its
limited and incomplete description of financial markets’
behaviour, and its role in the recent financial crisis. Section 2
generalizes the main observations and discusses the
complementarity between regulation and financial education.
In section 3 we discuss why programs on investor education
and financial literacy should be comprehensive, and not
limited to the mainstream financial economics. This discussion
argues that a combination of regulators and financial education
can be viewed as a risk management tool that may be used
when high uncertainty is present. This will result in
improvements in the markets, financial innovation and
intermediation, and benefits for society as a whole. The last
section summarizes the discussion and concludes the paper.

░ 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
For advocates of the mainstream doctrine, the EMH is not the
cause of a crisis and asset bubble, but it is only a (limited and
incomplete) description of how financial asset prices behave
over time. Nevertheless, for the information to be fully
reflected in the current price levels, as required by the EMH,
knowledge regarding investors’ risk attitude and management
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of the bulk of information is needed. Therefore, the EMH
implicitly assumes that investors are financially literate in that
they are able to collect relevant information, understand and
manage it.

2.1 The Hegemony of the EMH in the Last 60
Years, and its Failure
Paul Samuelson and Eugene Fama advanced in parallel their
hypothesis regarding market efficiency, but their contribution
lies in the different “expertise” developed by each author.
Samuelson offered a political and institutional expertise useful
to policymakers and the social benefit of speculation, while
Fama made practical recommendations for investors [20].
Their comparative contribution is important because each of
these two views have changed financial theory, policy
response and investment practice, and their assumptions have
guided financial markets’ regulators and driven financial
education.
Sharpe [21] postulated that the efficiency of the capital
markets is “self-evident to most professional economists” (p.
418) and Beaver [22] considered the EMH a triviality.
However, what makes the EMH non-trivial is the inability of
traders to assimilate the costly available information due to
their financial illiteracy. Since, because even if all information
were available at a low cost one cannot assume that all traders
are sufficiently skillful to interpret and manage the bulk of
data and evidence. In the same route Jensen [23] declared that
“there is no other proposition in economics which has more
solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient
Market Hypothesis”.
Conventional investment theory under the hegemony of the
EMH, posits that in competitive financial markets asset prices
reflect the dispersed information that is relevant to assets’
value, and thus, market prices are aggregators of the publicly
available information in the market. Therefore, no investor is
able to beat the market and earn abnormal profits, above the
average market returns at least in theory. But as Thaler and
Sustain [24] noted, “if you look at economics textbooks, you
will learn that homo economics can think like Albert Einstein,
store as much memory as IBM’s Big Blue, and exercise the
willpower of Mahatma Gandhi”. One could add that economic
agents infer much like as an expert system. This is partly
because after Fama’s formulation of the EMH and
Samuelson’s subsequent martingale presentation of it, most
textbooks in capital markets have blindly accepted this
theoretical framework of financial markets. As a consequence,
regulators have adopted and followed the EMH axiomatically.
This means that the rational investor is able to manage all
available information, and in this sense, the market is
considered to be a process of seeking equilibrium. This
equilibrium is optimal (Nash equilibrium), and if investors
optimize their decisions, then it is possible to reach it.
However, the dynamics, volatility, and complexity of markets
as well as investors’ behaviour do not allow for the
optimization of investment decisions. Thus, the ability of
investors to make decisions under rational expectations, no
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matter how important they are to market stability that could
lead to information efficiency, cannot be put into practice.
Many empirical studies using every possible statistical
technique and econometric modelling approach, have proved
that financial markets are not efficient. From simple
autocorrelation tests [25] to calendar anomalies [26, 27], and
non-linear tests and long memory effects [28, 29] there is
ample evidence against market efficiency across different time
periods [30] and market characteristics. Supporters of the
EMH wonder “how bubbles could have happened before the
words “efficient market” were first set in print” [2], although
the first bubble was known since 1637 (the Dutch “tulip
mania”) and many others have followed, up to 1929.
Regarding the implications of the efficient market hypothesis
in the financial crisis, Subramanian [11] summarizes the
theoretical criticism raised by regulators and renowned
academics. This criticism included comments by A. Turner,
chairman of the UK’s Financial Market Authority, who stated,
“market efficiency does not imply rationality, individual
rationality does not ensure collective rationality, … empirical
evidence illustrates large-scale herd effects and market
overshoots”, R. Shiller, Nobel Prize in Economics 2013 who
wrote, “the efficient market hypothesis is one of the most
egregious errors in the history of economic thought”, and J.
Stiglitz, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001, who stated, “the idea
behind the efficient market hypothesis is very powerful but
wrong”. Still, Krugman [12] considered this way of
understanding the market to be “foolish optimism”. According
to V. Ross [3], director of strategy and risk for the UK’s
Financial Market Authority, “there is a long list of deviations
from rational behavior which has been used to question the
EMH”.
There have been several critical reviews of the EMH. One is
the manifestation of “irrational exuberance” (a term first used
by Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan in 1996), which
characterizes investors acting as if there is no uncertainty in
the market, thus causing positive feedback. Another is
contagion appetite, as evidenced and discussed in Philippas
and Siriopoulos [31], where markets are prone to contagion
effect because of “macroeconomic imbalances, sovereign risk
perception and the arbitrage appetites” of internationally
diversified portfolios. A third route of critic comes from
behavioural finance. Kariofyllas et al. [32] and Philippas et al.
[33] described herding behaviors, where empirical evidence
shows the existence of over- and under-reaction in the capital
markets. Finally, Lo [34] advanced the Adaptive Market
Hypothesis under which market efficiency is a function of
many factors and of the degree investors and market
participants are adapted to changing market conditions, which
is in line with the assumptions of rational expectations theory.
Philippas and Siriopoulos [35] show that the adaptability of
investors needs a short time to materialise because of market
uncertainty and the deviations in pricing models in a given
time period.
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2.2 The Failure of the EMH and its Role in the
Recent Crisis
Nevertheless, in reality, the theoretical hypothesis of EMH is
not true because due to noise, investors are unable to abstract
all relevant information from market prices. Most of the
research devoted to the recent financial crisis called the EMH
responsible because of its role in the “chronic underestimation
of the dangers of asset bubbles” by investors and regulators
[1]. The reason is that regulators, analysts and investors felt
too comfortable with market efficiency and they failed to
detect any asset “bubble”. Even sophisticated investors were
overconfident about the risks involved in complex financial
products and responded as connoisseurs to any financial
innovation developed by the financial intermediaries and
Fintech. Still, the ability of economic agents to make informed
financial decisions, although critical to financial stability, and
to contribute to more efficient allocation of financial
resources, is problematic and calls for the coordination of
financial education and regulators [16, 36]. In this direction,
Bernanke [7] noted that “the recent crisis demonstrated the
critical importance of financial literacy and good financial
decision-making, both for the economic welfare of households
and for the soundness and stability of the system as a whole”.
Fox [4] pointed out the remarkable admission of the former
chair of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, that his trust in
market efficiency and belief that financial markets are selfcorrecting and that therefore government regulation and
supervision is not needed, were consistently wrong. In his
testimony before the Parliamentary Committee on
Government Oversight and Reform, Greenspan said that when
the markets collapsed, he was “shocked” and that “the whole
spiritual edifice collapsed” (p. xii). In Fox’s [4] sharp
summary, Greenspan accepted “that he had misunderstood
how the world works” (p. xi). This “intellectual edifice” of
Alan Greenspan is based on rationality and “market selfcorrection”, which has been supporting the EMH for half a
century now. If we take Greenspan’s testimony as valid, the
assumptions of rational expectations, with the associated
notion that informational asymmetries vanish in equilibrium,
are problematic in themselves and in their impact on the EMH,
even if they “round off” the role of markets.
Alan Greenspan's conception and that of others also of course,
of the market’s ability to self-correct, so that regulation and
supervision are not necessary, hastily contributed to the
deregulation of markets and the financialization of economies.
Regulators failed to realize that financial institutions, banks in
particular, are culture-specific [11], and that the financial
development of an economy is driven by financially literate
investors especially under the Fintech advancements. This is
particularly seen in developing countries and emerging
markets, where regulatory measures are insufficient and
financial literacy is quite weak. A result of the premature
liberalization of markets and the effect of rashly removing
regulatory restrictions, was the presence of, adverse selection
(financial institutions allocate loans to applicants without
screening, thus, they do not distribute credit efficiently) and
moral hazard problems (financial institutions undertake greater
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risks without applying the required risk management practices)
which further destabilized the financial system. Many studies
have reported the high correlation between the pricing of
credit with risk management and assessment [11].
In order to avoid sporadic and ad hoc regulatory actions as a
response to a crisis which could well make future crises more
probable and severe and could stifle financial innovation it
would be preferable for effective regulation to focus on the
specific source of the market failures and common features of
financial crises. As noted by Ross [3], “the crisis has shown,
for us regulators to sit back and rely purely on the market to
avoid asset price bubbles does not work either”. In other
words, this short-term and myopic perception of market
surveillance does not work. Besides the common
characteristics of a financial crisis - financial asset bubble,
credit flourishing, and capital inflows – the key role of
financial regulators is investors’ protection, and it should be
for the benefit of the society that regulators would deal with
the behavioural critiques of the EMH.
In fact, as former US President Barack Obama has argued
“irresponsible actions on Wall Street and daily investment
choices on Main Street” (Obama, April 2, 2010, para. 2) are
the cause of the recent crisis [37]. This position supports a
truth in the sense that the devaluation of financial assets is not
caused by any natural catastrophe but by the actions of
investors and the reactions of regulators in dealing with
financial crises. In other words, we do not need to redefine the
economy or demonize financial products and markets, as they
do not exist without our actions.

2.3 Financial Technology Risk
Specifically, with the advance of financial technology
innovation and in particular Fintech, it is expected an increase
of the participation of less wealthy household and less
financially educated investors into the financial markets [38].
Being able to have access to financial markets with low cost
transactions and thus widening financial inclusion, apart from
the expected benefits financial risk will rise as well. The
financial inclusion process implies more intense competition
between bank and nonbank providers insofar as the latter
proliferate and emerge as the first financial alternative
accessible to broad segments of the world's population [39].
This is mainly because Fintech and robo-advisors will
decrease the fixed costs and increase the access to the markets,
while big data availability will reduce the effectiveness of
existing regulations. As a result, a higher systemic risk is
expected, at least in the short term as it is difficult for
regulators to respond in a timely manner. For example, Vives
[40] argued that the banking industry is along the way of a
more customer-centric approach, and that it will be up to the
regulators to specify what level of protection will be afforded
to customers and how to drive a balance between financial
innovation and financial stability. Hence, the challenge for
regulators is to maximize the benefits of Fintech while
minimizing potential risks for the financial system. Finally, the
financial inclusion route is not risk free as the financial
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implications should not be decoupled from the labor or
educational and financial literacy dimensions [39].
On the other hand, regulation and financial innovation without
investor improvement would not work. For instance, the
complexity of complicated financial products makes them less
attractive to financial illiterate investors, and if used by them
minimizing the investment risk is not achieved. What could
have a positive effect would be their synergy and
complementarity. Besides that, however, even the combination
of stringent regulations and more financially literate investors
will not eliminate impending financial crises due to the
continuity of financial innovations [35, 41]. Therefore,
financially educated market participants will foster more
appropriate risk, assessed financial innovations as a reaction to
the many changes of the financial and regulatory architecture,
and as a response to the continuous process of searching for
low-cost financial instruments and transactions.

░ 3. FINANCIAL LITERACY AS A
RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL
3.1 Complementarity
Financial Education

of

Regulators

and

Irrational behavior may lead to investors taking decisions in
contradiction to market logic and leading to huge losses.
Recent research reports that individuals with higher levels of
financial illiteracy tend to make more high-cost transactions,
suffering higher fees and commissions and using high-cost
products and methods of borrowing [17, 18, 36, 42]. A related
research conducted by Agarwal, et al. [43] revealed a Ushaped pattern over the life- cycle, with the minimum amount
of transactions fees, commissions and investment mistakes
occurred at about age 53. Campbell [15] showed that
individuals often do not understand the terms of their
mortgages and committed major financial mistakes such as
absence of diversification, lack of ability to choose the right
financial instrument, and non-understanding of new financial
tools and under-participation in financial markets, with
important implications for financial innovation. Siriopoulos
and Skaperda [18] analyzed the performance of 1-and 5-stars
US mutual funds for the period 1981-2016 and reported that
investors pay higher fees for gaining an almost the same
return. This result is not in accordance with the rational
expectations theory and may be attributed to investors’ lack of
financial knowledge.
According to Wikipedia, “Financial literacy is the possession
of the set of skills and knowledge that allows an individual to
make informed and effective decisions with all of their
financial resources”, while Mandell [44] defined financial
literacy as “the ability of people to make financial decisions in
their own best short- and long-term interests”. The IOSCO
Education and Training Team [45] identified the concept of
“investor literacy” as the “understanding ordinary investors
have of market principles, instruments, organizations and
regulations.” Conferring to Huston [46], “financial literacy (or
ﬁnancial knowledge) is typically an input to model the need
for ﬁnancial education and explain variation in ﬁnancial
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outcomes” (p. 296) and has an application dimension, which
implies “that an individual have the ability and confidence to
use his/her financial knowledge to make financial decisions”
(p. 307). Lusardi and Mitchell [16] considered “financial
knowledge as a form of investment in human capital” that can
be used to improve welfare through better decision making
and mitigate systemic risks.
In sum, irrational behaviour and financial illiteracy lead to
investment decisions that are not in accordance with the EMH,
especially when they have to deal with structured financial
products that are too complex even for professional
institutions to understand. Haldane [47] offered as an example
that an investor in CDO needs to read and understand around
200 pages, in ABS CDO 30,300 pages, and in CDO2 more
than 1,000,000 pages. Subramanian [11] went further, saying
that “much of it was not comprehended by bankers and their
executive officers”. This is because investors adopt innovative
financial instruments without having prior knowledge, “just to
be ahead of the game” [35].
On the other side, investors’ protection and market confidence
are two of the major concerns for financial regulators. Thus,
the benefits and responsibilities of financial regulation and
financial education go hand in hand and should work in
parallel with one another. They interact. In particular, financial
education and financial literacy can be viewed as an
“additional tool available to securities regulators in supporting
regulation and supervision” [45], which could more effective
achieving the objective of investors’ protection. Lusardi and
Mitchell [16] stated that “financial regulation and financial
education are not necessarily substituting, as they can also
complement each other”. In addition, financial education can
play an important role in consolidating financial market
regulation. Informed investors not only protect their
investments, but also comply better with regulatory rules. In
other words, financial illiteracy could be considered as a
systemic risk factor.
Financial education has also preoccupied politicians,
especially since the 2008 crisis, as a possible solution to other
impending crises. For example, Canadian Finance Minister
Jim Flaherty acknowledged in a 2009 speech that “the recent
financial crisis has been fueled by a lack of financial
education”. Furthermore, the OECD noted that “financial
education has gained international recognition ... more and
more countries are developing adapted financial education
strategies and programs, introducing financial education into
the curriculum and designing specific learning contexts” [48].
In addition, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), in a recent Consultation Report [45]
underlined the importance of investor education and
emphasizes the role of financial literacy in the functioning of
the financial markets. In this report, the IOSCO also indicated
that investor education and financial literacy programs should
be supported by national securities and exchanges
commissions. In fact, the report underscored the value of such
programs as enhancing human capital investment, describing
them as important tools in the hands of financial regulators in
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supporting their efforts toward market supervision and
investors’ protection, because they “can help address any
misalignment of investor and industry interests, particularly
with respect to information asymmetry” [45].
Obviously, there is a strategic complementarity between
regulators and financial education. As our capitalistic
economy is increasingly financialized, and everything
including the real economy is acting like a financial market,
regulators’ strategic motivation to use investor education and
financial literacy programs as a systemic risk management tool
in preventing potential financial bubbles and panics has
become more important in recent years [49]. As of today, there
are numerous financial literacy programs offered by public
agencies. For instance, Bernanke [7] reported that Federal
Reserve Banks, through their Community Affairs offices, have
developed various financial education materials and programs
covering a series on topics that range from establishing
banking accounts to building wealth. In its 2014 report on the
investor education websites, IOSCO [45], several examples
from various countries of IOSCO members are also reported.

3.2 The Opportunity Cost of the Financial
Education
The recent financial crisis raised another important question
regarding the awareness of investors (private and institutional)
of the asset bubble that led to the crisis. It is logical to ask
whether investors did not consider the possibility of a stock
market bubble, given that their behavior seemed to indicate an
expectation that prices would continue to increase, and that
assets were thus priced incorrectly. In particular, the question
arises: How was it possible for investors- if they were rational,
believed in the EMH, and had access to low-cost information not to discern the asset bubble, in spite of all the evidence
provided by orthodox academic studies suggesting passive
management and index investment [2]? The orthodox view
that, prices discount everything completely and immediately
has no basis in fact. Also, as Gromb and Vayanos [50] noted,
there is no explanation as of why the arbitrage strategies fail to
adjust rapidly the prices to their fundamental values. An
obvious answer is that financial instruments and market
mechanisms and conditions are so complex that no investor –
even professional and sophisticated ones – can understand the
changes and adapt instantaneously.
Simon [51] showed that “bounded rationality” directs complex
decision processes. Thus, markets are not efficient because
investors cannot optimize. As a result, markets are necessarily
inefficient, and equilibrium models (such as the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, CAPM) are conditionally correct. Assuming
that investors are bounded rational, they prefer to replace the
complexity of markets with a business-manageable model
capable of leading to an investment decision in a reasonable
time. This is precisely the spirit of simplifying heuristic
behaviour: “substitution of the less complex for the
intractable” [52]. In other words, such behaviour follows
heuristic rules such as technical indicators, fundamental
analysis, herding or even, more recently, simplistic artificial
intelligence methods. This also means that there is less
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demand for financial innovative products and markets because
people do not understand their use and terms, and their value.
Herding behavior is also observed, where investors are acting
in concert without adequate knowledge and appreciation of
risk/reward trade-offs. Herding aggravates market volatility
and increases the fragility of the financial system [5]. Naive
and less financially literate investors “subsidize the costs of
more sophisticated financial products for those who can use
them appropriately” [15]. Thus, financial illiteracy increases
financial mistakes, has well-being implications for the
investors and households, and reduce the value of financial
innovation.
Many researchers today believe that the recent economic crisis
illustrated the cost of financial illiteracy. According to
Lussardi and Mitchell [16] “if the effects of financial literacy
on financial behavior can be taken as causal, the costs of
financial ignorance are substantial”. In addition, recent
research has provided evidence of a strong correlation between
financial education and a set of investment behaviors and
showed that financial mistakes are more frequent among the
young and less educated people [36].
Due to the bounded rationality of human beings, investing in
financial education reduces the likelihood of a severe future
systemic crisis. Yet saving this investment and transferring the
capital to another activity is also not certain to bring the
expected benefit. Thus, the opportunity cost of not investing in
financial education is high as it increases the likelihood of a
sudden future financial crisis. Therefore, a convex
combination of regulators and financial education may benefit
markets and society.
Convex payoffs benefit from uncertainty and extreme events.
The nonlinear properties of a convex payoff function offer the
opportunity to formulate rational and rigorous policies, and
ones that allow investors to take advantage of volatile and
uncertain markets. The more convex the payoff function,
expressed in the difference between potential rewards and
losses, the larger the convexity bias. This means that the
difference between the expected benefits of sporadic and ad
hoc regulatory measures aftermath the crisis (which is the
linear case where benefits and failures are equal), and one in
which benefits and losses are asymmetric (which is the case of
a convex payoff function) is greater. And as the financial
environment is volatile and uncertain, the higher the convexity
bias will be.

░ 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The role of the EMH and consequently of regulators and
investors in the recent crisis is not insignificant. Belief in a
problematic issue such as the EMH, both for investors and
regulators, underestimated the risks of high volatility and
soaring asset prices. Financial literacy supports investor
education and can work with regulators to protect against
future crises. However, even the most effective market
regulation combined with the best financial education of
investors, will not be able to eliminate future financial crises.
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In our opinion, there are two reasons which explain this
statement. The first is that investors’ preferences are convex,
in the sense that investors prefer high volatility and risk, as
opposed to the case of rational expectations, where investors
dislike risk. The second reason has to do with the real
economy and financial capitalism, which at times when returns
are small and therefore prices high leads to the devaluation of
financial assets. There is a fundamental flaw in the economy
of capitalist financial institutions, no matter how smart and
insightful investors may be, the speculative and innovative
elements of capitalism will eventually lead to financial uses
and relationships that lead to instability [54]. That is, programs
on investors education and financial literacy should be
comprehensive, not only to acquire and generate knowledge
about existing markets and its present regulatory
characteristics, but also “to reﬂect on the eﬀects and
complexity of behaviors and decisions from a responsible,
global and future-oriented perspective” [55].

implement financial education programs would contribute to
strengthened financial systems, to environments conductive to
financial innovation, and to more rational risk taking.
Consistent with this analysis, systemic risk is stronger in
markets where financial illiteracy is higher.

Finally, we believe that investor education, is a complex and
multifaced task and understanding financial markets one has
first to consider the economic mechanisms underneath. In
order to be able to help effectively, should be comprehensive
and not focus solely on knowledge and calculation of the
characteristics of the distribution of assets under the EMH and
the model of rational expectations, and to the myopic pricing
models. All economic agents in general and financial investors
in particular should be aware of the functioning not only of the
securities markets but also of the mechanisms of our
capitalistic system and the limitations of its ongoing
financialization.
In addition, financial education can play an important role in
consolidating financial market regulation. Informed investors
not only protect their investments, but also comply better with
regulatory rules. Financial industry and financial innovation
will also benefit. In fact, as has been shown by Philippas and
Siriopoulos [35], a financial innovation does not always add
value by making financial intermediation available to all
economic agents who can effectively use it by reducing
transaction costs and by making the market more attractive
[35]. These findings cannot happen, unless investors are
financially literate and educated. Therefore, financially
educated market participants will lead to more appropriate
risk-assessed financial innovations along with low cost
financial instruments and transactions.
In this paper we discussed the role of financial literacy as a
systemic financial risk management tool. We first discussed
the role of the efficient market hypothesis in the recent
financial crisis and the strong belief of regulators in its
assumptions. We argued that overconfident to the market
efficiency hypothesis in combination with financial illiteracy
increased the financial systemic risk.
Our analysis suggests that this combination generated bubbles
in financial assets return and that this momentum effect was
likely to be strongest in those markets whose interpretation of
ambiguous financial information was required. Actions to
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